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The claims of petitioner that he was denied his constitutional rights are based entirely on faulty assumptions
or wild assertions, or on misstatements made pertaining
to the proceedings and to the evidence. When the same
misstatements were made on the motion for new trial, the
trial court found it necessary to state:
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"The court has deemed this memorandum necessary due to some statements made by counsel for the
defense during trial and repeated or enlarged in said
motion. Some are not factually true and some others
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create or tend to create impressions not representative
of the true situation." (Pet. App., pp. la-2a.)
We readily concede that there was widespread publicity, all of which was noted by the trial and reviewing
courts. But the claims that either the jury or judge were
influenced in the trial of the case by news media or by
anything other than the evidence received in open court
are groundless and unsupported by the record. And a fair
and objective examination of the record will disclose that
the news media did not slant their stories to prejudice or
to convict the petitioner.
Counsel for the petitioner refer to certain newspaper
articles and headlines which were later submitted as Exhibit No. 1 on the motion for new trial. Neither the newspapers nor the headlines were evidence in the trial of the
case and counsel's assertion that during the trial the jury
were reading these newspapers is nowhere supported in
the record. In various places in the petitioner's brief,
reference is made to newspaper articles and headlines,
none of which were received in evidence on the trial of
this cause. The fact that they were offered and received
in evidence before and after trial on the various motions
made by counsel for the petitioner does not make them
evidence considered by the jury in the trial.
Of a certainty, there is in the record no proof, no
"demonstrable reality" that either the jury or the judge
were influenced in the trial of this case by anything except the evidence presented in open court and the law
applicable thereto. The petitioner was tried by a fair and
impartial jury who were properly instructed at all times by
the court and rendered their verdict after careful and
conscientious deliberations. The petitioner was fairly tried
and properly convicted.
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Counsel for the petitioner not only conducted a
searching voir dire examination, and did not exhaust his
peremptory challenges, but stated to the jury in argument:
"May I take this opportunity-as I started to say,
may I take this opportunity to congratulate you on the
splendid attention, the tireless effort you have displayed during these nine weeks. You have been deprived, probably, of many comforts that you ordinarily enjoyed in and around your home with your
family because of the admonitions that you have received throughout the trial by his Honor, Judge Blythin.
"The purpose, ladies and gentlemen, of those admonitions was that we could come to this point in the
lawsuit where your minds would be free, your minds
would be open, and that you could take into consideration all the facts and all the testimony that has
been submitted to you without any outside influence,
and I am sure, and I say this to you sincerely, because
I have had the opportunity of observation during this
entire period, that you have done just that." (R. 537172.) *
During the impaneling of the jury, the progress of
the trial, the instructions of the court and the summations
of the attorneys, the jurors were repeatedly told that this
cause was to be decided solely on the basis of the evidence
presented in open court and on the law given them by the
judge, and on nothing else. Each juror agreed that he or
she would disregard everything other than the evidence
and would, in conformity with the instructions of the
court, render a fair and impartial verdict. It is to be noted
that a fair and impartial jury was impaneled and that the
defense did not exhaust their peremptory challenges. The
jurors took the oat.h required by law and there is not a

* Typewritten record. Original Bill of Exceptions filed in
Washington.
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shred of evidence in the record that each and every juror
did not fully and completely abide by the oath so taken.
There is not a particle of evidence in the record to
show that the jury was in any way influenced by reports
or stories in newspapers, over the radio, or on television;
or that the jury or any juror was biased or prejudiced by
any such stories or broadcasts.
The laws of the State of Ohio provide for a motion
for new trial and upon the hearing of that motion, the
affidavits and testimony of the jurors may be received.
Emmert v. State, 127 0. S. 235; State v. Joseph, 90 0. A.
433. Although several jurors were subpoenaed and were
thoroughly interrogated by defense counsel on the hearing on the motion for new trial, not a word of testimony
was produced to justify the defense claim that the jurors
were influenced by anyt.hing other than the evidence produced in open court in reaching their verdict. The claim
that they were influenced by news stories or any other outside influence is merely the assertion of counsel. It is not
supported by the record.
The trial and proceedings on review were had in accordance with the provisions of the statutes and Constitution of the State of Ohio and in full conformance with the
provisions of the Federal Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The extraordinary excursions in petitioner's brief to
newspaper stories and editorials published before, during
and after the trial, as though they were before the jury as
evidence in the case, and the omission by the petitioner
of almost all of the pertinent evidence presented by the
State in this case, necessitates our directing the attention
of this Court to an objective statement of much of the evidence as set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals
of Cuyahoga County, appearing at pages 41a to 67a of
the Appendix to the Petition.
The State proved by direct and circumstantial evidence that Marilyn Sheppard was brutally murdered in
her bedroom sometime between 3 and 4 A. M. on the
morning of July 4, 1954; that at the time she was murdered the only person in that home, except a six year old
son, was her husband, the petitioner. It was conclusive
from the evidence that there was a simulated burglary and
that nobody but the petitioner had the time and the opportunity to fake such a burglary to divert suspicion from
himself. The fantastic stories told by the petitioner were
so unreasonable and absurd as to be, in the opinion of
the jury, unworthy of credence.
After giving "a summary of much of the evidence
dealing with many of the physical facts and conditions
of the premises as found on July 4th and of the declarations and actions of the parties involved as testified to by
the public authorities and other witnesses, together with
what the defendant said to others and in his testimony
upon trial in relation to the events of the morning" ( 66a
of the Appendix to the Petition), the Court of Appeals
then continued:
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"T.he testimony of the defendant, in dealing with
the events that took. place in his presence or the
things that he did, was characterized by the State as
vague, indefinite, uncertain or factually highly improbable. During the time he was under cross-examination the defendant gave evasive answers such as
'I can't recall' or 'I can't remember,' approximately
216 times to questions concerning facts and circumstances that took place in his claimed presence material to the issues in the case.
"The jury, under the instruction of the court, was
presented with but one question or issue of fact and
that was, had the State shown beyond reasonable
doubt that the defendant purposely killed Marilyn
Sheppard?
"The State's case is based in part on circumstantial evidence. The law of Ohio on this subject requires that the facts and circumstances upon which
the theory of guilt is based must be established beyond reasonable doubt and the facts so established
must be entirely irreconcilable with any claim or
theory of innocence and admit of no other hypothesis
than the guilt of the accused. Carter vs. State, 4 Oh.
App. 193.
"If, therefore, the jury, after careful deliberation,
found t.hat there was any possible hypothesis of innocence, after a consideration of all of the evidence,
then the defendant would be legally entitled to be discharged, but if the jury found, after full deliberation,
there was no possible hypothesis of innocence based
on the facts as they found them to be and that the
facts found are such as to be irreconcilable with any
other reasonable hypothesis, than the guilt of the
accused, then a verdict was required.
"This was a jury question and we hold that there
was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty
as found by the jury." (Appendix to the Petition
66a-67a.)
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ARGUMENT.
PUBLICITY DID NOT DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

ms

I and II.
Publicity did not prevent the petitioner from
having a fair trial.
No matter when or where tried, the Sheppard case
would have attracted widespread publicity. This was inherent in the very nature of the case itself. The right to
grant a change of venue lies in the sound discretion of the
trial court. The trial court stated on the motion for new
trial in ruling on the denial of the motion for change of
venue and for a continuance:
"(3) Denial of change of venue requested by defendant. The request, when made, was based upon
the claim that the extraordinary public attention
centered upon the case in this county by the various
media of news made the securing of a fair and impartial jury in this county impossible. It is a matter of
common knowledge that the case commanded that
same attention throughout Ohio and the United States
of America. It commanded very much attention
throughout the free world. Chief counsel for the def ense conceded and asserted this to be a fact and stated
fervently that the defendant could not have a fair trial
in Ohio, or even in the United States. The only conclusion from that assertion must be that the defendant
cannot be tried at all on an indictment for Murder in
the First Degree. Such a claim furnishes its own
answer.
"Seldom indeed has there been a case about which
the average citizen was so confused by the published
stories, or more uncertain about what the facts actually were. With present-day means of communica-
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tion the same precise stories were simultaneously published in every city and county in the State and it
certainly will not be denied that Cuyahoga County
is the most liberal county in the State and, as a result,
the best in which to conduct a trial involving a much
publicized charge of crime, whatever its nature. It is
to be borne in mind that no issues which break into
fiames and which tend to produce passion and prejudice were involved in this cause. No issue of race,
corruption, killing an officer, or the like, was involved
-what actually was involved was a mere mysterya 'whodunit.' The only safe and sure way to determine whether a fair and impartial jury can be secured
is to proceed to impanel one. The court reserved ruling on the motion pending such an effort and became
convinced, and is still convinced, that an intelligent,
sincere, patriotic and fair jury was impaneled. Upon
that being accomplished the court overruled the motion and believes such action was not error. Section
2945.06 Revised Code of Ohio provides that a person
charged in a case such as this may waive trial by jury
and elect to be tried by a panel of three judges. While
not challenging the right of a defendant, in a proper
case, to a change of venue it does seem that the lack of
confidence in any jury anywhere, coupled with the
failure to elect to be tried by a panel of three judges,
smacks of objection to any trial at all.
" ( 4) Error in denying application for continuance.
The crime charged in the indictment occurred on July
4. Trial started October 18. Defendant's counsel had
been engaged and active from a time within hours
following the crime and long before defendant's arrest.
Seventy-five prospective jurors had been summoned
with full knowledge of all counsel long before any
application for continuance was filed. The only ground
stated for a continuance was 'to permit the extraordinary publicity to quiet down.' It was not claimed that
counsel were not prepared for trial nor was any sug-
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gestion made as to who was going to 'quiet down' the
publicity, nor when nor how." (Pet. App. pp. 2a-4a.)
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Judge
Bell stated:
"Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense·
were combined in this case in such a manner as to
intrigue and captivate the public fancy to a degree
perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout
the preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal
skirmishes and the nine-week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the
American public in the bizarre. Special seating facilities for reporters and columnists representing local
papers and all major news services were installed in
the courtroom. Special rooms in the Criminal Courts
Building were equipped for broadcasters and telecasters. In this atmosphere of a 'Roman holiday' for
the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his
life." (Pet. App., pp. 85a-86a.)
The reference by the Ohio Supreme Court to the
words "Roman holiday" merely describes the widespread
publicity furnished by the news media to the public at
large and had no reference to the conduct of the trial itself, nor to the proceedings in the courtroom. The expression is also used to mean a "good time" or "field day." It
by no means follows that the news media slanted the news
or even tried to do so to prejudice or to convict the petitioner. As clearly indicated by Judge Bell in his opinion, it
was a case involving "murder and mystery, society, sex and
suspense." The curiosity of the public, excessive though it
may have been, necessarily brought about the widespread
publicity. The news media were interested in stories for
the public and cared not whether such stories favored the
State or the defense. A fair and objective analysis of their
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stories to the public will disclose that they made no effort
to slant the stories, certainly not to influence the jury in
arriving at their verdict.
The defense have submitted a wholly distorted picture
of the arrangements made by the court before trial to govern the news media which were to "cover" the trial. (Pet.
Br. pp. 38-40.) (Pet. App. pp. l 7la-172a.) For a fair
and objective statement pertaining to such arrangements,
we direct the attention of this Court to the words of the
trial judge in his memorandum on the motion for new
trial.
Regardless of what action was taken by the trial court,
it was certain that all of these newspaper reporters were
to be present and that demands would inevitably be made
upon the trial court by all types of news media. The trial
Judge stated, in ruling upon the motion for new trial:
"Realizing that the case had caught the public
imagination to an extent leading national and, indeed,
international news media to decide to fully 'cover'
the trial, and having requests for space from many of
them, the Court decided to make proper arrangements
before trial and to control the situation so as to
minimize and, if possible, eliminate confusion during
the trial. The court room is small.
"The Court assigned specific seats to individual
correspondents in the rear of the court room and back
of the trial area, and issued orders that there was to be
no crowding or congregating at the front end entrances (one on each side of the bench) of the court
room; that there was to be no passing back and forth
through the trial area and that all entries to and movings out of the court room be via the public doorway
in the rear of the court room. Members of the defendant's family were accommodated with seats at
all times during the trial. The same was accorded
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members of the family of the murdered Marilyn.
Members of the general public were admitted to the
extent of the seating capacity of the court room and
a scheme of rotation was established so that many
persons attended some sessions of the trial and no
favored members of the general public were present
at all times, nor permitted to be.
"Rules were prescribed for photographers and representatives of radio and television stations. They
were cautioned that no cameras were to be permitted
in the court room excepting in the morning before
the convening of court and at the close of the day
after adjournment, and that in no event were pictures of the defendant to be taken in the court room
at any time excepting with his consent or that of his
counsel.
"The Court's arrangements and orders were carried out with one or two simple insignificant exceptions, due to overenthusiasm. The defendant and his
chief counsel were far more gracious to the press,
photographers and gallery than was the Court. A
very large number of pictures of the defendant, his
family, counsel and friends were taken in the court
room (outside of court session periods) with their
permission and without complaint. Counsel for the
defense held press conferences in the court room with
cameras clicking; all to the apparent delight of counsel
for the defense, and, naturally, without protest.
"Julian Wilson, a photographer for the Associated
Press, testified on this point at the hearing had on the
motion and supplemental motion. His testimony
stands wholly unchallenged and it states the procedure followed with perfect clarity.
"Jurors were fl.ash-photographed in their comings
and goings and it is difficult to know how that can
be prevented even if, indeed, it should be. Jurors
are human beings and become citizens of special im-
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portance when undertaking a signal public service.
Not a single complaint was registered by any juror
in this connection and it is worthy of note that the
defense does not even claim that any juror was affected in the least by it. Furthermore, they were not
flashed by agents of the State nor on its behalf. Such
exposures to public attention are not matters of prejudice for or against either the State or the defendant,
but matters of news interest to newspapers. They
remain wholly neutral if fed sufficient news or pictures of interest.
"Some space outside of the court room which could
be spared for the moment without interference with
the public service was used by publicity agencies for
their typewriters and other equipment but it is definitely not true, as stated in the motion herein, that:
'The Assignment Room, where cases are assigned
for other causes to court rooms, was assigned by the
Court to reporters and telegraphers.'
"Some generally unused space in the Assignment Room
was so assigned. Neither person, record, nor piece
of equipment in the Assignment Room was moved,
removed or displaced and the Assignment Room
functioned normally throughout the entire period of
the trial of this cause. One of the real purposes of
assigning that space to the uses mentioned was to
remove them entirely from the immediate court room
area. They were out of the corridors leading to the
court room and permitted free movement of the public and visitors within the building, whether there in
connection with this case or otherwise, wholly unaffected by the Assignment Room space activity."
(Pet. App., pp. 7a-9a.)
It is pertinent to ask: What caused the publicity, and
who brought it about?
Marilyn Sheppard was murdered-there could be no
doubt about that-and it became the duty of law enforce-
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ment officers to thoroughly investigate and to bring to
justice the person who murdered her. A protective shield
was immediately thrown around the petitioner. The officials of Bay Village, close personal friends of the petitioner who was their police surgeon, sat on their hands and
were getting nowhere. It was inevitable that there would
be publicity concerning the petitioner's unwillingness to
be interrogated, save on his own terms and conditions, and
that the public officials would be criticized, such criticism
of public officials not being the exclusive prerogative of
defense counsel. These incidents occurred in July and the
trial did not begin until the 18th of October.
There was no assurance that the publicity would not
continue if a motion for a continuance was granted. Further, the trial court was not required to speculate as to
whether a trial at a later date would result in more or less
publicity. The Constitution provides that the defendant in
a criminal case is entitled to a speedy and public trial. As
it was, the petitioner was not brought to trial until three
and a half months after the crime was committed, and
the trial court was not required, in view of the Constitutional provision, to delay the trial indefinitely, otherwise
the petitioner could be heard to complain that his constitutional right to a speedy and public trial was violated.
It is not within our province to explain or defend
anything that appears in any newspaper, favorable or unfavorable. That there was a tremendous amount of interest
in this case, not only throughout our own community, but
throughout the state and nation, and in other parts of the
world, is not in dispute. It does not follow, however, from
the mere fact that this murder mystery fascinated so many
people, that the petitioner was prevented from having a
fair trial or that any of the petitioner's constitutional rights
were violated.
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Petitioner has seen fit to set forth what purport to be
newspaper headlines. (Pet. Br. pp. 20, 21.) Selected were
certain headlines, which, by and large, merely· reflected
the great interest of the public in the murder mystery and,
of course, deliberately omitted were particular headlines
that tend to contradict his assertions. Petitioner does not
set forth the headline on the front page story in the Cleveland News of July 9, 1954, by Severino P. Severino, News
Staff Writer, who, as he states, was granted permission to
question Dr. Sam in the presence of his father, Dr. Richard
A. Sheppard, and his attorneys, William J. Corrigan and
Arthur Petersilge. The headline in large type reads:

The defense also might have included other headlines
as follows:

"EXCLUSIVE! 'I LOVED MY WIFE-SHE LOVED ME,'
SHEPPARD TELLS NEWS REPORTER."

Nor does he list the headline in the Cleveland Press of
August 18, 1954, reading:
"DR. SAM WRITES HIS OWN STORY."

Under the headline appeared the text of a statement by
Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard, furnished the Press by a member
of his family, and above the headline is an enlarged photograph of the last paragraph of the statement, followed by
the signature of the petitioner, and reading:
"I AM NOT GUILTY OF THE MURDER OF MY WIFE,
MARILYN. HOW COULD I, WHO HAVE BEEN
TRAINED TO HELP PEOPLE AND DEVOTED MY LIFE
TO SAVING LIFE, COMMIT SUCH A TERRIBLE AND
REVOLTING CRIME?"

Nor does petitioner list the headlines of the statements
issued by Attorneys William J. Corrigan and Fred W.
Garmone, such as the one appearing in the Cleveland
Press of August 27, 1954, reading:
"SHEPPARD LA WYERS HIT STORIES ON MURDER"

followed by the text of the long statement so issued.

July 8, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"DR. SHEPPARD'S STATEMENT ISSUED TO ANSWER
GOSSIP"

July 8, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"BAY DOCTOR TALKS TO REPORTER"

July 8, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"HUSBAND PUTS $10,000 UP FOR SLAYER"

July 9, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"TEXT OF DOCTOR'S STATEMENT ON HIS OFFER OF
REWARD"

July 9, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
I

"DOCTOR WILL HELP IN HUNT FOR DEATH WEAPON
TODAY"

July 10, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"HONORED ATHLETE AT HEIGHTS HIGH"

July 12, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"DR. SHEPPARD RETURNS TO BAY VIEW HOSPITAL
TO TREAT HIS PATIENTS"

July 15, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"DRUNK 'CONFESSES' BUT STORY FIZZLES"

July 17, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"DR. SHEPPARD TELLS PRESS 'KILLER WILL BE
CAUGHT'"

(Then follows responses to 11 questions.)
July 31, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"TEXT OF STATEMENT BY CORRIGAN AFTER ARREST
OF CLIENT, DR. SAM"
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July 31, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"POLICE CORDIAL, POLITE AS THEY TAKE SHEPPARD"

August 13, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"FAMILY POINTS TO BAY MAN AS NEW SUSPECT
AS HOVERSTEN TALKS"

August 19, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"DR. SAM IS ANXIOUS TO TAKE STAND, HIS BROTHER
SAYS"
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October 26, The Cleveland Press:
"SAM, WOMAN JUROR SOB IN COURT"

October 27, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"CITY CHEMIST AIDS DEFENSE OF DR. SAM"

October 28, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"JUROR OUT, ADMITS SHE WAS FOR SAM"

November 4, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"LETTERS WRITTEN IN JAIL BARE SHEPPARD FEELINGS"

September 14, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"BATTLES PROWLER IN BAY. CORRIGAN LINKS
BOY'S STORY WITH SHEPPARD CASE"

September 17, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"DR. STEVE HITS 'RED HERRING' ACCUSATION"

October 19, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"WRITER FINDS DR. SAM'S LOOKS BIG ASSET FOR
ACTOR CORRIGAN"

October 21, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"DR. SAM JUST LIKE A BROTHER, 2 SISTERS-IN-LAW
SAY AT TRIAL"

November 5, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"DR. SAM SAYS AUTOPSY BUNGLED"

November 9, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"CORRIGAN MUSES ON TRIAL'S DRAMA"

November 10, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"GARMONE QUIZZING WILTS MAYOR HOUK"

November 11, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"HOUKS HELP DR. SAM AS MUCH AS THEY HURT"

November 11, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"DEATH HOME OPENED TO DR. SAM'S KIN"

October 22, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"CORRIGAN RATED SECOND DARROW"

November 13, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"CORRIGAN'S STRATEGY SCORES"

October 25, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
" 'OTHER SIDE' OF CORRIGAN LIES IN POETRY"

(With picture of W. J. Corrigan and his writer
daughter.)
October 26, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"COURT PSYCHOLOGISTS SEE TRIAL CROWD AS
NORMALLY CURIOUS"

November 15, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"CORRIGAN HAMMERS AT DRENKHAN"

November 16, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"CORONER IS VILLAIN OF CORRIGAN PIECE"

November 17, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"DR. STEVE HITS PRINT THEORY; SAYS BLOOD
FLOWED INTO FOLD"
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November 17, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"DR. SAM WRITES TO HIS SON"

(Photo of Letter.)
November 18, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"DR. SAM DISPLAYS NO-WEAPON THEORY"

(With picture demonstration.)
November 19, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"DR. STEVE'S TIP IS EX-PATIENT"

November 19, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"ORDERED HOVERSTEN OUT, DR. STEVE SAYS"

November 19, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"SEEK STEVE'S 'SUSPECT' IN DETROIT"

November 20, 1954, The Cleveland Press:
"SCHOTTKE AIDED SAM: DR. STEVE"

November 22, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"PROBE NEW BAY TIP; DETROIT MAN CLEAR"

November 22, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"SLAYING 'SUSPECT' IS WRITTEN OFF"

December 2, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"EVIDENCE CHANGED: DR. STEVE"

December 4, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"CHIP PAYS CALL ON STORE SANTA"

December 7, 1954, The Cleveland News:
"DR. SAM THANKS REPORTER"

During the trial most of the publicity was given out
by the defense. As a former newspaper man, defense
counsel knew very well how to get favorable stories in the
public press, and he was quite successful. He held press
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conferences daily, and frequently more than once each day;
and, with his client, posed for hundreds of pictures which,
together with favorable personal stories, appeared in all
types of news media. The amount of publicity so put out
by the defense was enormous, and far outshadowed the
attention given the State. Defense counsel found that by
continually denouncing the newspapers and public officials,
he could get an even greater amount of publicity. Mr.
Corrigan's skill in the art of publicity is demonstrated by
the innumerable stories that appeared, emanating from the
petitioner, his counsel, his relatives and his friends. Dr.
Steve Sheppard, petitioner's brother, and a prospective
witness, so persisted in trying to have the petitioner's case
tried in the newspapers that the trial court was required to
admonish him that if he did not desist he, being a witness,
would be excluded from the courtroom. The bales of newspapers offered by the defense in support of their motions
show these favorable personal stories and the innumerable
photographs for which the petitioner and his counsel posed.
Mr. Corrigan also demonstrated his accomplishments
as an actor by pretending to object to the pictures and
reading his objection into the record. The photographs
themselves, and the stories which accompanied them, show
complete acquiescence and pleasure. That the objection
made for the record was without justification and mere
pretense is proved by the testimony of Julian Wilson during the hearing on the motion for new trial. Mr. Wilson
was a photographer for the Associated Press, assigned to
this trial, and testified that he made many pictures of Dr.
Sam Sheppard and considerably over a hundred of Mr.
Corrigan (R. 7088). His testimony speaks for itself:
"Q. Now, did you take any pictures in this court
room while the court was in session?
A. No, sir, I did not.
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Q. Now, while the court was not in session, during recess or after adjournment, did you take pictures
in this court room and around this building?
A. Many times.
Q. Did you take pictures of Mr. Corrigan?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About how many times?
A. Roughly-it would run considerably over a
hundred negatives.
Q. About a hundred negatives. And of Dr. Sam
Sheppard?
A. I made many pictures of him.
Q. And Mr. Garmone?
A. He, too, I have made many pictures of.
Q. Now, did Mr. Corrigan ever object to your
taking of any of these pictures?
A. A few times he has objected.
Q. When was that?
A. About the middle of the trial or towards the
end of it, Mr. Corrigan-we were instructed that Mr.
Corrigan didn't want any pictures made of himself,
the defense, or the defendant.
Q. How many pictures had you taken without
his objection before you received those instructions?
A. Oh, many.
Q. More than 50?
A. I'd think so.
Q. And after you received the instructions, did
you stop taking pictures?
A. Yes, sir.
0. And how long did that continue?
A. About a week and a half, two weeks.
Q. Then what occurred?
A. We asked Mr. Corrigan's permission.
Q. And did you get it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then resumed taking pictures?
A. Yes.

Q. How many pictures did you resume takingdid you take after you resumed taking those pictures?
A. I'd say not as many as before because we
didn't need as many pictures.
Q. More than 20 or 25?
A. About that.
Q. Now, with respect to the defendant, Dr. Sam
Sheppard, is the number of pictures that you took
before the objection by Mr. Corrigan about the same
as what you took of Mr. Corrigan?
A. About, yes.
Q. You took about 50 before. Then there was
this period when you didn't take any pictures because
of the objection, is that correct?
A. That's true, sir.
Q. And then did you later resume?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. With whose permission?
A. Well, when we got Mr. Corrigan's permission,
we resumed taking pictures.
Q. And about how many did you take after you
got permission?
A. Somewhere around 15, 20, 25.

*

*

*

*

*

Q. Did you ever take a picture of either Dr. Sam
Sheppard or any of his counsel over their objection?
A. No, sir.

*

*

*

*

*

The Court: May I have just one question? Were
you present at the conference which the Court had
with photographers prior to the opening of the case?
The Witness: Yes, sir, I was.
The Court: And at which the Court stated what
the rule would be as to taking pictures during the
trial?
The Witness: I was.
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The Court: Do you recall what that was as to
taking pictures within the court room and of the
defendant and his counsel?
The Witness: Yes, I do recall.
The Court: All right. State it.
The Witness: Your ruling, sir, was that no pictures would be made at any time when the court was
in session, and you also requested that we make no
pictures of the defendant or the defense or anyone
without their permission. I believe that is the gist of
the thing.
The Court: That's correct." (R. 7087-7091.)

"It is to be noted that not a single person or agency
connected with the investigation of, or prosecution,
for the crime involved escapes the anathema of the
defense. These include the police, the Coroner, his
assistants, the prosecuting attorney and his aides, the
State's witnesses, the Grand Jury, its foreman, the
trial jury, the public, the bailiffs and the Court. The
sense of search for truth and the declaration of justice
seems to have vanished from a whole community as if
by magic and overnight.
The news agencies of every kind and character
are thrown in for good measure. In spite of all the
charges made, not a single specific item is cited in
support of the claims made. Only broad generalities
are indulged in. Reviewing courts will, we hope, have
the duty of passing on all the legal questions involved
and appearing on the record, and unless it is shown
in very clear fashion that some extrinsic forces plowed
through the effort to grant the defendant a fair trial,
and succeeded in disrupting that effort, it is fair to
assume that none did." (Pet. App. pp. 15a-16a.)

It is obvious from the record that Mr. Corrigan's objections, if any, were quite proforma and mere pretense.
Counsel for the petitioner applied for a continuance
of the trial to "permit the extraordinary publicity to quiet
down." The trial did not start until October 18th and
counsel for the petitioner had been engaged in the case
within hours following the crime on the 4th of July. It was
not claimed that they were not prepared for trial and, as
the Trial Court stated: "nor was any suggestion made as
to who was going to quiet down the publicity, nor when,
nor how." (Pet. App. p. 4a.) This application was therefore properly overruled.
There is no question but that there was a great deal
of public interest in this case. It should not be necessary
to point out that newspapers have a constitutional right to
report events in the community and to criticize what appears to them to be laxity on the part of public officials.
Defense counsel have seen fit to devote a considerable
portion of their brief to criticism of public officials; surely,
the newspapers have an equal right. The Trial Court put
it very succinctly when he stated in ruling upon the motion
for new trial:
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There is a comparatively recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which states succinctly
the right of the people. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367,
374, the Court said:
"A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public property * * * Those who see and
hear what transpired can report it with impunity.
There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which
enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of
democratic government to suppress, edit or censor
events which transpire in proceedings before it."
The right of the people in this respect was recognized more
recently in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920:
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"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the
public should know what goes on in courts by being
told by the press what happens there, to the end that
the public may judge whether our system of criminal
justice is fair and right."
The only question with respect to the motion for
change of venue was, could a fair and impartial jury be
impaneled in this community, where the offense occurred?
The question was answered by the impaneling of the jury.
A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, even though the
defense did not exhaust their peremptory challenges, either
as to the first 12 jurors or as to the alternate jurors.
As stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Ohio in this case:
"At the outset of the trial, in response to defendant's motion for change of venue, the trial court said:
'The motion for change of venue will be held in
abeyance, and we will proceed at 1: 15 this afternoon in an effort to determine whether or not we
can secure a fair and impartial jury. If we are not
able to do that, there will be no question in this
court's mind at all but what this case ought to go
out of Cuyahoga County, whatever may be the
effect of that.'
"At the conclusion of the impaneling of 12 jurors,
the motion for change of venue was renewed (for the
third time) , at which time, in overruling the motion,
the trial court said:
'That the best evidence in the world is the effort
to select a jury, and what we get here in a picture
that has taken almost two weeks of time. The court
is thoroughly satisfied that we have here a fair and
impartial group of people to try this case, and I
doubt if under any conditions at any time anywhere
in this state you could have a better looking group
of people and a more intelligent group of people,
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as a whole, to try a case of this kind, and the court
is thoroughly satisfied that they are a group of fair
and impartial people who can properly try this
case under the guidance of the court, and I hope
we will be able to give them that in the manner that
it ought to be given.'
"The same motion, advanced for the same reason
'
was renewed on five other occasions during the trial,
and the trial court in each instance overruled the
motion.
"We believe the trial court was justified in those
rulings. In Townsend v. State, 17 C. C. (N. S.), 380,
25 C. D. 408, affirmed without written opinion in 88
Ohio St. 584, 106 N. E. 1083, it is said:
'The examination of jurors on their voir dire
affords the best test as to whether or not prejudice
exists in the community against the defendant; and
where it appears that the opinions as to the guilt
of the defendant of those called for examination
for jurors are based on newspaper articles and that
the opinions so formed are not fixed but would
yield readily to evidence, it is not error to overrule
an application for a change of venue.'
"For example, in Richards v. State, 43 Ohio App.
212, 183 N. E. 36, it was held that the exercise of the
right to order a change of venue lies in the trial court's
discretion, and that a refusal to order a change of
venue without prejudice until it can be determined
whether a fair and impartial jury can be impaneled is
not an abuse of discretion. See also, Dorger v. State,
40 Ohio App. 415, 179 N. E. 143; State v. Stemen, 90
Ohio App. 309, 106 N. E. (2d) 662; State v. Deem,
154 Ohio St. 576, 97 N. E. (2d) 13.
"If the jury system is to remain a part of our system of jurisprudence, the courts and litigants must
have faith in the inherent honesty of our citizens in
performing their duty as jurors courageously and
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without fear or favor. Of the 75 prospective jurors
called pursuant to this venire only 14 were excused
because they had formed a firm opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. A full panel was accepted before this venire was exhausted, and defendant exercised but five of his allotted six peremptory
challenges.
"In the light of these facts, and particularly in the
light of the fact that a jury was impaneled and sworn
to try this case fairly and impartially on the evidence
and the law, this Court cannot say that the denial of
a change of venue by the trial judge constituted an
abuse of discretion." (Pet. App. pp. 87a-89a.)
The process of impaneling the jury demonstrated the
wisdom of the foregoing rules and there was no unusual
difficulty in securing a fair and impartial jury. The analysis of this process is briefly stated in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals as follows:
"The record in this case discloses that a special
venire was called for the trial of this defendant as
provided by Sec. 2945.18 R. C. Seventy-five names
were drawn from the jury box. Of this number, 11
were immediately excused for justifiable reasons or
were not found, and counld not be summoned (three
in number) by the sheriff. Of the remaining 64, 13
were excused because they had formed a firm opinion
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and 10
were likewise excused because they were opposed to
capital punishment. Sixteen others were excused for
cause.
"The State used four peremptory challenges and
the defendant five. As is provided in Sec. 2945.21
the State in a homicide case where there is but one
defendant, is entitled to six such peremptory challenges and the defendant a like number so that when
the jury was sworn, the defendant left the right to one
peremptory challenge unused. From the foregoing
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analysis of the venire of 75 electors called in this case,
four of those called were not needed in impaneling a
jury of 12. Such jury was selected as provided by law
and sworn and accepted by the defendant to well and
truly try and true deliverance make between the
State and the defendant.
"The parties agreed to select two alternate jurors
as provided by Sec. 2313.37 R. C. The four remaining jurors of the original list, together with an additional venire of 24 summoned as provided by law,
were used for this purpose. Of the 24 summoned,
eight were called and questioned together with the
four from the original venire, in impaneling the two
alternate jurors. Of those examined, three were excused for holding a firm opinion of the guilt or innocence of the accused, four were excused as being
against capital punishment, one was excused on challenge for cause and each side used one peremptory
challenge. (Each side had the right to excuse two
prospective alternate jurors peremptorily under the
provisions of Sec. 2313.37 R. C.)
"The analysis of the impaneling of the jury in this
case where but 16 prospective jurors out of 72 examined could not sit because they had prejudged the
guilt or innocence of the accused, clearly shows that
there was no difficulty whatever in impaneling a fair
and impartial jury.
"The jury having been impaneled as provided by
law and sworn to afford the defendant a fair and impartial trial, and to come to its verdict by a consideration of the evidence submitted in open court without
any outside influence or consideration, and where
there is no claim of misconduct on the part of any
member of such jury during the trial, there can be
no ground to claim a mistrial because of continued
publicity, publicizing the events of the trial, and
other related matters." (Pet. App. pp. 34a-36a.)
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In their discussion on publicity and the fact that a
number of jurors had read about the case before their
voir dire examination, Juror Barrish is mentioned (Pet.
Br. p. 35) together with the reason he gave for having
read about the case.
The further extended examination of Juror Barrish
by both parties is omitted from the petition and the defense omit to state that they accepted Juror Barrish by
passing him for cause (R. 115) and that they had peremptory challenges which they chose not to exercise.
The fact that prospective jurors had read something
about the case before they were sworn as jurors did not
necessarily disqualify them. We know of no principle of
law which excludes such jurors from service merely because they had previously read or heard something about
the case. The persons who could hear the evidence without bias or prejudice and could decide the issues fairly
and impartially were seated. Those who could not, were
excused.
The defense try to make capital out of the efforts to
solve this murder, especially in the weeks following July
4.th. Naturally, the public authorities would check out
every tip, good or bad. The same may be said for the
newspapers, and if the petitioner and his lawyers pursued
a course of conduct that was not in accord with protestations of innocence, comment by newspapers and others
was inevitable.
The mere suggestion that the petitioner, who was
protesting his innocence, submit himself to certain tests
(Pet. Br. pp. 22, 23) deprived him of no constitutional
right nor prevented him from having a fair trial. He was
not forced to take any test and he did not submit to any
test. Also discussed by petitioner under the subject mat-

ter of publicity is the evidence received with respect to
the conversations had with the petitioner on the question
of the lie detector test.
When the subject of the lie detector was first presented in the questioning of Officer Schottke and he related the conversation he had had with the petitioner pertaining to the lie detector, no objection was made to the
admission of those conversations (R. 3590) .
The trial court instructed the jury that a person is
not compelled to take a lie detector test (R. 3852). The
petitioner himself on direct examination in response to
questions asked by his counsel, Mr. Corrigan, related his
conversations with Officers Schottke and Gareau pertaining to the lie detector test (R. 6298-6299).

In the argument to the jury, defense counsel said:
"And then during the course of that conversation
he (Officer Schottke) says, 'Are you willing to take
a lie detector test?'
"And what was the answer that this man gave?
He says, 'I am.'" (Record, pp. 5376-77.)*
Such a claim in the argument was, of course, wholly unjustified in the light of the testimony of Officer Schottke
and Deputy Sheriff Rossbach, who were continually put
off by the petitioner and the petitioner never did take the
test. The statement of petitioner in the brief that there
was objection to these conversations is entirely untrue
(R. 3590).
The police and other public authorities are severely
criticized for trying to obtain a "confession" from the
petitioner. (Pet. Br. pp. 29-31.) What is unconstitutional
about the police endeavoring to secure a confession? No

* Typewritten Record. Original Bill of Exceptions filed in
Washington.
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one laid a hand on the petitioner and the most that can be
claimed is that some officer used some bad words.
Much is made of the use of the words "third degree"
in a newspaper editorial, but it should be remembered that
that expression is .frequently applied to a thorough interrogation and does not at all necessarily mean the use of
force or violence. In any event, there was no force or
violence used. Defense counsel must have been fearful
that a confession might have been obtained. How else can
they explain the extraordinary effort they made to prevent
the petitioner from being interrbgated except by friendly
officers under stipulated conditions? How else can they explain their "sit down strike" in the county jail on Sunday,
August 1st, 1954, when counsel appeared at approximately
8: 15 o'clock in the morning and, by alternating one with
the other, remained with the petitioner until afternoon, to
prevent the interrogation of their client by the officers who
were obliged to cool their heels downstairs during the entire period of time? And when the sheriff, noting that
counsel was merely reading a newspaper, requested the
attorneys to leave, the defense bitterly assailed him, charging him with violations of law and of the constitution.
They even saw fit to make charges against the sheriff to
the Bar Association and at a subsequent hearing thereon
before the bar committee, counsel who made the charge
did not even extend to them the courtesy of an appearance.
We should also note that later that same Sunday, after
some police officers had futilely interrogated the petitioner,
they were asked to leave by the sheriff in order that he be
revisited by Messrs. Corrigan and Petersilge. The officers
got nowhere in trying to question the petitioner and no
confession was obtained. So what point is there in dwelling
upon the subject matter of "confession"?
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The defense also dwell on newspaper editorials critical
of the progress that was being made in the solution of this
horrible crime (Pet. Br. p. 24). It must be remembered
that the Mayor of Bay Village was a close personal friend
of the defendant, as were the police officers in Bay Village
for whom he was the police surgeon; that he was whisked
off to Bay View Hospital by his brothers without permission before the Coroner or any of the Cleveland police officers arrived; that a protective shield was thrown around
him and that the defendant and his counsel would permit
no interrogation except under their own terms and by
designated friendly officers; and that the defendant and
his counsel were obstructing the public authorities in what
should be the normal investigation of a murder. It seemed,
at least to the newspaper editors, that certain public officials were "sitting on their hands" and were fearful, for
one reason or another, of proceeding vigorously in the investigation as they would in any other case. Certainly,
these newspapers have a right to criticize what they deem
to be laxity on the part of public officials. It is a right given
them by the same constitution which assures the defendant
a fair trial by jury. Whether we or defense counsel agree
or disagree with the opinions expressed by the newspaper
editors is entirely beside the point.
The defense refer to the inquest held in the school
auditorium in Bay Village and again proceed to distort the
nature of the proceedings and what occurred (Pet. Br. pp.
24-26). Ignored entirely is the testimony of Dr. Gerber
that he had made arrangements for the inquest and had
actually issued subpoenas before the Press editorial appeared, and that the reason it was held in Bay Village was
that most of the witnesses lived there and it would be convenient for them. Also untold is the fact that the hearing
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was in perfect order during the testimony of the petitioner,
his parents, his brothers, the doctors, Don Ahern and
Nancy Ahern, Mayor and Mrs. Houk and the Bay Village
officers. There was no disorder until the last few minutes
of the last day of the public hearing when Dorothy Sheppard was recalled to testify further. It was brought about
by Mr. Corrigan, counsel for petitioner, who sought to
direct the reporter to insert certain matter into the record.
Mr. Corrigan was told not to do so and was cautioned that
if he persisted, he would be asked to leave. He not only
persisted, but ordered the reporter to make the insertions
in the record, refused to desist when so requested, refused
to sit down when so requested and challenged the authority of the Coroner to put him out. The Coroner had no
alternative and was obliged to have Mr. Corrigan removed
from the hearing room. This occurred within a few minutes
before the close of the hearing. Furthermore, the inquest
was held on July 22nd, 23rd and 26th and there was at
that time no indictment of the petitioner. The indictment
came later, and the trial did not start until October 18th.
The disturbance at the inquest which Mr. Corrigan created
has no possible bearing on the trial of this case, nor did it
prevent the defendant from having a fair trial.
The petitioner states that he was taken from the jail
and subjected to personal indignities (Pet. Br. p. 31). This
is completely without foundation in fact. The defendant
had complained of injuries and he was taken to the Cleveland City Hospital where he was given a complete and
thorough physical examination. Nowhere in the testimony
of the petitioner himself does he assert that he was abused
by the doctors. The procedure of "pricking a patient with
a pin" is merely to test the patient's reflexes and there is
nothing abusive in this practice, so commonly used.

The petitioner dwells on various matters (Pet. Br. pp.
32, 34) preliminary to this trial, including his own applications for writs of prohibition, habeas corpus, etc., all of
which have no bearing whatever on the trial of this cause.
On page 34 of the petitioner's brief, it is asserted that
the indictment was the result of pressure on the Grand
Jury. This statement is based solely on an expression of
the foreman, Mr. Winston, that "pressure on us has been
enormous." The complete answer of the foreman explaining the "pressure" was as follows:
"Q. What was the pressure that was placed on
you?
A. Only curious people who wanted to know
what we knew on the Grand Jury." (Emphasis ours.)
The pressure was for information and not, as suggested by
defense counsel, to indict the petitioner.
Complaint is made (Pet. Br., pp. 40-41) relative to
the part taken by the Trial Court in a Fabian television
program on the steps of the Court House. The trial judge,
on one morning, walked toward the Court House steps
as usual, and there saw Robert Fabian (a retired Superintendent of Scotland Yard) with a very small contraption
in his hand. Mr. Fabian said, "Good morning, Judge
Blythin, nice morning." The judge said, "Good morning,
Mr. Fabian." (Pet. App., pp. 13a-14a.) There was no conversation of any kind about the case on trial or any other
subject.
At pages 41-42 of the petition, the defense recount
the incident of a newspaper reporter visiting the home of
Lois Mancini, an interview with Mrs. Mancini's mother,
husband and children, and of the pictures taken of the
members of the family, together with a story of the difficulties of the family while the mother was serving on the
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jury. There may be some question as to the good taste of
such a story, but in any event it did not favor one side or
the other and was entirely without prejudice to the defendant. Furthermore, Lois Mancini was not present during
the visit of the reporter and did not participate in the
interview. We wish to also note that she was merely an
alternate juror and did not participate in the deliberations
or the verdict.
It is urged that during the trial there was a broadcast
by Walter Winchell (Pet. Br. p. 42), in which he related
the story of a woman in New York who claimed she had
been a mistress of Sam Sheppard. At the request of defense counsel the court inquired of the jurors whether they
had heard this Winchell broadcast and two jurors responded that they had. The jurors had no knowledge that
Mr. Winchell was to broadcast anything at all pertaining
to the Sheppard case or to Sam Sheppard. The two jurors
who heard the broadcast were asked by the Court: "Would
that have any effect on your judgment?" Both answered,
"No." The Court stated:
"I do hope, ladies-I would like to ask if any of
you know if any members of your families heard the
broadcast?
"Have any of you, other than these two ladies,
heard anything about that broadcast last night? And
I wish to ask you two ladies in particular, and all of
you in general, to pay no attention whatever to that
kind of scavenging. It has no place, in my judgment,
on the air at all, but that is not for me to determine,
but surely it has no place whatever in our thinking or
considerations or thoughts in any way, shape or manner in this case. Let's confine ourselves to this court
room, if you please." (R. 5429-30.)
Urged for the first time in the Supreme Court of Ohio
as error was the refusal of the trial court on motion for
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continuance in the 5th week of trial to ask the jurors if
they heard a broadcast by Bob Considine over Station
WHK in which there was something said about the testimony in the Sheppard case (Pet. Br. p. 41). This matter
was brought up in the court's chambers and neither the
court nor the prosecutors had any knowledge whatsoever
of the alleged broadcast. Mr. Corrigan, counsel for the petitioner, complained that Bob Considine had paralleled a
denial of the petitioner as set forth by Officer Schottke
with a denial of Alger Hiss when he was confronted by
Whittaker Chambers, without stating that Dr. Sheppard
was in bed in the hospital at the time of his denial, while
Mr. Hiss was strong, mentally and physically.
Apart from this assertion of counsel, no proof whatever was submitted to the court as to the exact nature of
the broadcast, although Mr. Considine was available it
being conceded by the defense that he was in daily 'attendance at the trial. When the court stated: "We are not
going to harass the jury every morning," Mr. Corrigan
then responded, "I can't help it, Judge. If you don't, that's
all right with me. I make my exception." (R. 3725.)
Upon the hearing on the motion for new trial and
even though several of the jurors had been subpoenaed,
the defense produced not a word of testimony to support
their present claim that the jurors heard this broadcast.
There is in the record not one particle of evidence that any
of the jurors were influenced by this broadcast or the socalled Winchell broadcast or by anything else other than
the evidence produced in open court.
That it was not error for the court to refuse to interrogate or poll the jurors during the trial as to whether they
had read a newspaper article or heard a radio broadcast
such as the Considine broadcast, is affirmed by the annotation in 15 A. L. R. (2) 1152, wherein it is stated:
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"The present annotation is concerned with the
question of whether, during a criminal trial, the jurors
may be interrogated or polled as to whether they have
read newspaper articles pertaining to the alleged
crime or the trial. As the title indicates, the annotation involves the propriety of interrogation or polling
after impanelment, as distinguished from that which
occurs on voir dire examination.
"The few cases that involve this specific point all
uphold the trial court where it refuses to interrogate,
or refuses to let a party interrogate, the jurors as to
the reading of newspaper articles relating to the trial
or the crime. The decisions generally turn on the fact
that the trial court had instructed the jury not to read
the articles or that there had been no showing by the
moving party that the jurors had in fact read them."
Complaint is made that the jurors were photographed
on several occasions and "during deliberations" (Pet. Br.,
p. 44) . It is, of course, not the fact that they were photographed during deliberations.
On the motion for new trial, the trial court stated:
"Jurors were fl.ash-photographed in their comings
and goings and it is difficult to know how that can be
prevented even if, indeed, it should be. Jurors are
human beings and become citizens of special importance when undertaking a signal public service.
Not a single complaint was registered by any juror in
this connection and it is worthy of note that the defense does not even claim that any juror was affected
in the least by it. Furthermore, they were not fl.ashed
by agents of the State nor on its behalf. Such exposures to public attention are not matters of prejudice for or against either the State or defendant but
matters of news interest to newspapers. They remain
wholly neutral if fed sufficient news or pictures of
interest." (Pet. App., pp. 8a-9a.)
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The Trial Court stated further on the hearing on the
motion for new trial:
"While this Court would not for the world minimize the importance of guarding this jury-or the
jury in any other case-from annoyance or influence,
he must express the thought that human beings,
whether serving as jurors or not, cannot be wrapped
in cellophane and deposited in a cooler during trial
and deliberation.
"The jury in the instant case was jealously guarded
throughout the entire proceedings and it is worthy
of note-and indeed decisive in this Court's judgment, that not a suggestion of influence upon the jury
is forthcoming from any person or agency. Interference or influence must be the test. If we are to
convict jurors without a scintilla of evidence of undue influence on them, it is now pertinent to halt
and ask ourselves what becomes of our faith in our
decent fellow-citizens and of what value is the jury
system at all.
"It is claimed that the jurors were permitted to
separate on one or two occasions within the period of
their deliberations and were so photographed. Foreman Bird and Bailiff Francis testified that the socalled separation of jurors was merely their momentary division in the dining room of the hotel for
the purpose of photographing the men in one group
and the women in the other. It was in the presence
of the two bailiffs, was only a few feet in extent and
there was no communication of any kind with the jury
by the photographer. To term such a petty detail a
'separation' is stretching the imagination to a dangerous point. It certainly is not the separation prohibited
by law and is hardly worthy of serious thought or
comment.
"The Court had complete confidence in the jury in
this case; it was protected at all times from any pos-
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sible approach, and its every movement and conduct
would seem to be an eloquent demonstration of the
fact that it proved itself worthy of the confidence
placed in it to faithfully carry out the admittedly
tremendous responsibilities entrusted to it." (Pet.
App. 12a-13a.)
Much is made at pages 45-46 of the petitioner's brief
of "Disorder During the Trial." Counsel complains that
there were instances of disorder, noise and laughter in the
court room. It should be remembered that this trial continued for some nine weeks and that necessarily there are
times when people are required, for one reason or another,
to leave the court room. A few of these occurrences caused
the Court to admonish the spectators to the end that there
be no interruption of the trial proceedings. There are, of
course, the inevitable traffic noises on East 21st Street in
Cleveland which result in short delays or repetition of the
questions.
As to the incident of the laughter to which Mr. Corrigan refers (Pet. Br., p. 46), it resulted from Mr. Corrigan's remark, "~ell, I don't care what the conversation
was," after he had asked the witness what the substance
of a conversation was, and the witness had given his
answer.
Counsel complains of the presence and conduct of
unnamed persons in and about the court room and corridors during the five days in which the jury was deliberating in their jury room (Pet. Br., p. 49). If the unnamed
persons interested in the outcome of the trial, whether
they be newspaper men, counsel for the defendant, the
defendant's brothers, Dr. Steve Sheppard and Dr. Richard
Sheppard, their respective wives and friends or other
spectators, milled around during the five days, or if some
of them played cards during the long wait, we fail to see

how that in any way influenced the jury in its deliberations or had any bearing on the verdict. There is not a
scintilla of evidence in the record that the jury was disturbed or influenced by any of the activities in the court
room or in the corridors while they were in their jury
room during their deliberations.
Petitioner has presented nothing by way of affirmative evidence to show that the court or jury had been improperly influenced by publicity or anything else. The
burden is upon them to do so. Section 2945.83 of the Revised Code of Ohio, governing the state courts on review,
provides:
"No motion for a new trial shall be granted or
verdict set aside, nor shall any judgment of conviction
be reversed in any court because of:

***
"(C) The admission or rejection of any evidence
offered against or for the accused unless it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused was or
may have been prejudiced thereby;

***
"(E) Any other cause unless it appears affirmatively from the record that the accused was prejudiced thereby or was prevented from having a fair
trial."
This rule in Ohio is in conformity with the ruling of this
Court as expressed in United States v. Handy, 351 U. S.
454:
"While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that "it is
not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such
injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and
that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but
as a demonstrable reality.'
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"See also, Adams v. United States, 317 U. S. 269,
281, 87 L. Ed. 268, 276, 63 S. Ct. 236, 143 ALR 435;
Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 431, 87 L. Ed.
1492, 1496, 63 S. Ct. 1129; Stroble v. California, 343
U. S. 181, 198, 96 L. Ed. 872, 885, 72 S. Ct. 599."

the weekend. Counsel for the defense thereafter proposed
that he would consent to the discharge of Juror Manning
if the entire panel was discharged and we would proceed
to re-impanel the jury. This proposal was declined by the
State.

This Court pointed out in the Handy case that Justice
Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court in Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245, 251, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 1029, 31 S. Ct.
2, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138, cautioned that:

After the alternate jurors were impaneled, Juror Manning addressed himself to the Court in open court and
stated:

"If the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a presumption that they exist, it
will be hard to maintain jury trial under the conditions of the present day."
OTHER MATTERS SET FORTH IN APPLICATION OF PETITIONER DID NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW, NOR, WHEN THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
ARE CORRECTLY STATED, WAS THERE ANY ERROR
IN THE RULINGS OF THE COURT.

III.
As to Juror Manning (Pet. Br. pp. 50-52) and his
replacement by the alternate juror.
After Juror Manning was seated and sworn as a juror,
a young man came to the Criminal Courts Building, talked
to counsel for the defendant first and later to the Prosecutor, and informed them that Juror Manning had been
arrested and convicted of a morals offense relating to a
young man. The matter was also brought to the attention
of the Court. Manning neglected to make this conviction
known when he was asked on the voir dire examination
whether or not he had ever appeared as a witness in any
case. The matter became known generally and received
considerable publicity. A meeting was held in chambers
and by common consent the matter was continued over

"Juror Manning: Right now, I mean from what is
going on, when I came down here for jury duty I
thought I was doing what a public spirited citizen of
this country would do. That's the only idea I had
when I came down. It interfered with my work, my
earning a living. I didn't give a second thought to
that. I came down here, and if I was chosen, I would
serve and serve in the way I spoke, absolutely unbiasedly. And I was-I tried to run myself from the
heart and mind together and be absolutely unbiased
and unprejudiced in thinking and talking with other
people, even speaking outside this jury. But after
what has happened, I would not be able to sit in that
box with the other jurors, be able to listen to the case
and be unbiased, unprejudiced or-unemotional is
what I am trying to drive at mostly; that if this keeps
up, if I am kept on the jury, I think I will be a subheadline as long as the trial goes on. I will definitely
have a nervous breakdown in a very short time and,
in fact, I feel I am just about ready for one right
now." (R. 1600-1601)
The Trial Court excused Juror Manning on the ground
that he was both disabled and disqualified.
Revised Code Section 2945.29 (13443-13) provides:
"Jurors becoming unable to perform duties. If, before the conclusion of the trial, a juror becomes sick,
or for other reason is unable to perform his duty, the
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Court may order him to be discharged. In that case,
if alternate jurors have been selected, one of them
shall be designated to take the place of the juror so
discharged. If, after all alternate jurors have been
made regular jurors, a juror becomes too incapacitated
to perform his duty, and has been discharged by the
. Court, a new juror may be sworn and the trial begin
anew, or the jury may be discharged and a new jury
then or thereafter impaneled."
Revised Code Section 2313.37 (11419-47) provides
in part:

"If before the final submission of the case to the
jury a juror becomes incapacitated or disqualified, he
may be discharged by the judge, in which case, or if a
juror dies, upon the order of the judge, said additional or alternate juror shall become one of the jury
and serve in all respects as though selected as an
original juror."
The defense contend that they had one challenge
left when Juror Manning was excused and his place taken
by alternate Juror Hanson (Pet. Br., p. 51). As the Court
of Appeals stated:
"The defendant entered his exception to the procedure used by the Court in discharging Juror Manning and demanded the right to exercise his remaining peremptory challenge when the first alternate
juror was seated in the panel after Manning was discharged, which request was refused.
"After a jury is sworn and charged with the delivery of the defendant, the trial is commenced and
unused peremptory challenges cannot thereafter be
used and where an alternate juror has been selected
and sworn as provided by law, he must be seated in
the place of the discharged juror by order of the
Court." (Pet. App., 38a-39a)
In any event, there is here no federal question.
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The prospective jurors were questioned at very great
length by both counsel for the State and the defense, and
the Court. In fact, there are three volumes of the Bill of
Exceptions, totaling hundreds of pages, setting forth such
detailed examination. Except for Juror Manning who was
discharged, the 13 jurors who sat and heard this case, and
the 12 jurors who decided this case, were all competent
and qualified jurors, without prejudice or bias, and the
record discloses that they gave most careful and adequate
consideration to the case.

IV.
Conduct of the bailiffs in permitting jurors to telephone
members of their families between deliberations (Pet.
Br., pp. 52-54).
We wish to point out, at the outset, that the matters
complained of took place in the hotel room when some
of the jurors called their husbands or children on the telephone, and not in the jury room during the deliberations
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 52-53). The jurors deliberated in
a room above the court room in the Criminal Courts Building and there is absolutely no evidence in the record showing any misconduct of the jury or of the officers in charge.
The telephone calls to the husbands and children of
the jurors, all made in the presence of the bailiff, were
not made during the deliberations of the jury. They were
made from the hotel room to which they had been taken
from the jury room and there is no evidence whatsoever
that the case was even discussed in these telephone calls,
much less anything said prejudicial to the petitioner.
There is no evidence whatsoever of telephone conversations with strangers, as suggested in the brief of the
petitioner. The testimony of Bailiff Edgar Francis follows:
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"Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge,
whether there was any telephone communications
made out of any of the respective rooms that were
occupied by any members of the jury?
A. Their phones were cut out, Mr. Garmone.
Q. By whose request?
A. Mr. Steenstra arranged that.
Q. And were there any telephone calls made
from the room that you occupied?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you make the calls, or did the jury make
the calls?
A. No. The jury made the calls, and I sat in the
chair right alongside the telephone.

* * *

Q. Mr. Bailiff, what was the purpose of the calls
that the jurors made in your presence?

***

A. Well, they were made to their husbands and
wives, and those that had children, they talked to the
children.
Q. Was there any conversation whatsoever about
this case or their deliberations?
A. Not one word, Mr. Parrino." (R. 7084-7085.)
The defense saw fit to call certain jurors to the witness stand on their motion for new trial and if they wished
to pursue this matter further, they had the right and
opportunity so to do. They chose not to do so and there
is nothing in the record whatever of anything having been
said or done either by the bailiffs or by or to the jurors
prejudicial to the defendant.
The trial court stated when a supplemental motion
for new trial was filed:
"The court named Simon Steenstra, permanent
criminal jury bailiff and Edgar Francis his own courtroom bailiff as the persons to have charge of the jury
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in their movements during the period of deliberation.
They were named in open court in the presence of
all interested parties. Both were well known to all
parties, with the possible exception of defendant, and
not a word of objection was voiced by anyone. Furthermore, one of counsel for the defense saw the
court in chambers prior to the selection of said bailiffs
and inquired of the court who he intended to appoint
to take charge of the jury during the deliberation
period. Upon being informed that the court would
name Bailiffs Steenstra and Francis he expressed his
whole-hearted approval." (Pet. App., pp. 16a-17a).
The Supreme Court of Ohio in the opinion states:
"Defendant contends that he was prejudiced in
this case by the actions of two officers of the court,
in whose charge the jury was committed during its
deliberations, in permitting some members of the jury
to make unmonitored telephone calls in violation of
Section 2945.33, Revised Code, which reads as follows:
'When a cause is finally submitted the jurors
must be kept together in a convenient place under
the charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict, or are discharged by the court. The court
may permit the jurors to separate during the adjournment of court overnight, under proper cautions, or under supervision of an officer. Such
officer shall not permit a communication to be made
to them, nor make any himself except to ask if
they have agreed upon a verdict, unless he does
so by order of the court. * * *'
"It is conceded that no authorization for such telepl).one calls was given by the court.
"At the conclusion of each day's deliberation, the
members of this jury were housed in the Carter
Hotel, under the supervision of two court bailiffs.
The record reveals that the telephones in the hotel
rooms occupied by individual jurors had been 'cut
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out.' However, some of them were permitted to make
calls on the telephone in the room of one of the bailiffs.
"In connection with a motion for a new trial, the
record discloses the following cross-examination of one
of the bailiffs by counsel for defendant:
'Q. Did you make the calls, or did the jury
make the calls?
A. No. The jury made the calls, and I sat in
the chair right alongside the telephone.'
"On redirect examination, the testimony was as
follows:
'Q. Mr. Bailiff, what was the purpose of the
calls that the jurors made in your presence?

***
A. Well, they were made to their husbands
and wives, and those that had children, they talked
to the children.
Q. Was there any conversation whatsoever
about this case or their deliberations?
A. Not one word, Mr. Parrino.'
"Counsel for defendant rely upon State v. Adams,
141 Ohio St., 423, 48 N. E. (2d) 861, 146 A. L. R.
509, as authority for their contention that the action
of the bailiff in permitting these telephone calls
constituted error prejudicial to the defendant. They
cite the third paragraph of the syllabus of that case,
which reads:
'The violation by a court officer in charge of a
jury of Section 13448-1, General Code (Section
2945.33, Revised Code), to the effect that he shall
not communicate with a jury in his charge or custody except to inquire whether it has reached a
verdict, will be presumed to be prejudicial to a defendant against whom, after such communication,
a verdict is returned by such jury.'
"A mere reading of the following fourth paragraph
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of the syllabus of the Adams case should be sufficient
to distinguish that case from the present one:
'Where a court bailiff, on being informed by
the jury during its deliberations that it could not
agree, stated to it: 'You can't do that. You must
reach a decision if you have to stay here for three
months,' there is a violation of the statute which
is prejudicial to a defendant against whom, following such declaration, a verdict is returned by the
jury.'
"The case of Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio St., 235,
187 N. E. 862, 90 A. L. R. 242, although not cited by
defendant, might also be authority for the proposition that misconduct of a bailiff is ground for reversal. That case, however, is also readily distinguishable from the present one. In the Emmert case the
officer in charge of the jury, at a time when it was
not actually in its deliberative sessions, said to certain
members of the jury: 'My God, you are all wet. Judge
Stahl expects you to return a verdict of guilty and if
you don't it will be just too bad.' Other remarks
of a similar nature to the effect that the jury had to
reach a verdict were made by the bailiff.
"In situations such as those in the Adams and
Emmert cases, it is easy to presume prejudice to the
defendant as a result of the conduct of the bailiff. Can
the same be said of the conduct of the bailiffs here in
permitting jurors, who for several days and nights
had been sequestered and unable to see or hear from
their husbands, wives or children, to telephone those
members of their families? We do not think so. There
is, on the contrary, every reason to believe that assurances of the health and welfare of their loved ones
would tend to ease the jurors' minds as to personal
matters and would make them better, more conscientious jurors. Time after time, the members of this
jury were instructed by the court not to communicate
with anyone concerning this case or permit anyone to
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communicate with them about it. We must assume
they followed the court's instructions. No complaint
is made that they disregarded these instructions every
night for some seven weeks that they were allowed
to go home at the close of each day's session of the
trial. It is difficult to visualize a juror who will follow
a court's instruction during the many hours he spends
each evening and week end with his family and then
deliberately disregard that instruction in a few brief
moments he speaks to a member of his family on the
telephone in the presence of a bailiff.
"The law in Ohio is that no judgment of conviction
shall be reversed in any court for any cause unless it
appears affirmatively from the record that the defendant was prejudiced thereby or was prevented
from having a fair trial. Section 2945.83, Revised
Code. There is no such affirmative showing of prejudice here, and this Court will not presume a prejudice as a matter of law from the fact that some of
the jurors made telephone calls to members of their
immediate families." (Pet. App., pp. 89a-92a.)

v.
On the claim that the authorities seized the home of the
petitioner (Pet. Br., pp. 54-56).
The defense make reference to matters concerning
the possession of the home (Pet. Br., pp. 55, 62) which
they made an issue on the motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, which motion was
denied by the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals
of Cuyahoga County in 100 Ohio Appeals 399 and dismissed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 164
0. St. 428. No appeal has been taken from the final action
of the Supreme Court of Ohio and the judgment of our
State courts thereon is now final. Notwithstanding the
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finality of this judgment, the defense again drag into their
petition for a writ of certiorari the unfounded claim that
they were prevented from examining the premises. The
Court of Appeals, in a well reasoned and extended opinion,
have completely answered this claim in 100 Ohio Appeals
at pages 406-407:
"During the trial the defendant subpoenaed the keys
into court through Chief Eaton and demanded the
right to retain them. The trial judge, however, ruled
that they must remain in the possession of the police
of Bay Village, which order was carried out until
December 23, 1954, when complete possession of the
house was given the defendant. There is no evidence
.that any request to enter the house for the purpose
of investigation and inspection was ever made by the
defendant, nor does the record show any formal application to the court at any time for a like purpose.
Dr. A. J. Kazlauckas, a physician and expert who had
spent many years as a deputy coroner of Cuyahoga
County, was in the employ of the defendant. He examined all the articles of property pertaining to this
case in the possession of the county coroner, together
with the autopsy report, conclusions of laboratory
findings and X-rays of Marilyn Sheppard, and yet
made no effort to make any scientific examination of
the premises. He was not even presented as a witness
during the trial. Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Saul
S. Danaceau deposes in his affidavit that he informed
Arthur E. Petersilge, of counsel for the defendant,
and the brother of the defendant, Dr. Stephen Sheppard, in early November, 'that t.he said house was
available to the defendant at any and all times to inspect or conduct investigations therein.' It seems,
however, that it was understood that on all occasions
a police officer would have to accompany the defendant or any representative of his when visiting the
home."
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The record of this case shows the extreme importance
of numerous articles of property within the home and
a number of such articles appear as exhibits in the evidence. It was also necessary to continue the examination
and search in and about the house for possible clews and
particularly for the still missing T-shirt and weapon. The
record will disclose the continuous examination of the
premises for blood spots, fingerprints, etc., by the scientific unit of the Cleveland Police Department and by members of the staff of the county coroner. As stated by the
trial court, the prosecutor "could very well have been subject to just criticism" had he directed Chief Eaton to act
otherwise.
Further complaint is made that the Court erred in not
ordering the keys to the house turned over to Mr. Corrigan
during the testimony of Chief Eaton. This episode occurred during the closing days of the trial when a subpoena was issued to Chief Eaton, requesting the Chief to
bring with him the keys to the house. As a matter of fact,
the defendant, counsel for the defense, and the members
of the defendant's family had never been denied an opportunity to enter the premises or any part thereof, or
to make an examination or investigation therein. Also, as
a matter of fact, the defendant, counsel, and defendant's
family ,had visited the premises and at no time had they
been denied access thereto.
The cross examination of Chief Eaton at that time ,
by Mr. Mahon, was as follows:
"Q. Chief, since you have had that key-you got
it some time in November, the key to the house; is
that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From that time down to date has the house
been accessible to the Sheppard family?

A. Yes, it has.
Q. And have they been in the house during that
period of time?
A. Once, on one occasion, at least.
Q. To take care of the heat, and so forth, and
water, and all of those things?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Have they ever been denied at any time the
right to go into that house since you have had pos·
session of the keys?
A. They have not." (R. 6076.)
"By Mr. Corrigan:
Q. And the order that Sam Sheppard could not
go into his home, where did that come from?
A. Pardon me. Will you repeat that?
Mr. Danaceau: We object to that. We know
of no such order.
Q. Did you make that order?
Mr. Danaceau: Just a minute.
Mr. Mahon: Was there such an order?
The Court: Let him tell what the situation
was.
Mr. Mahon: There is no evidence there ever
was such an order.
The Court: No, there isn't any evidence about
an order, but he is the Chief of Police. Let him answer if there was.
A. I didn't understand the question, I'm sorry.
The Court: Will you restate your question, Mr.
Corrigan? The Chief doesn't understand it. Or
let the reporter repeat it.
(Question read by the reporter.)
A. There was no order he could not go in his
home.
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Q. The order that Sam Sheppard could not go
into his home except in the custody of a policeman or
with a policeman, how did that originate?
A. That was suggested, I believe, by the prosecutor's office." (R. 6077-6078.)

Obviously, the whole episode in the closing days of
the trial, and the demand for the keys in the presence of
the jury was a grandstand play and show, and nothing else.

In the meantime, the defendant and his counsel had,
on more than one occasion, visited the home and, as previously pointed out, went through all the rooms and examined the house, both inside and outside. The defendant
was permitted to remove his medical bags and the contents. He and the members of his family were also permitted to remove his clothing, Chip's clothing, and various
other articles. Also removed were his automobiles, consisting of a Jaguar, a Lincoln Continental and a jeep. Except for the Lincoln Continental, all of these articles of
property were removed within a week or two following the
murder of Marilyn Sheppard and became unavailable for
further examination by the scientific unit of the Cleveland
Police Department when, at a later date, the case was
turned over to them for further investigation. Also made
available to the defense for their inspection were all of
the articles in the possession of the county coroner and
such articles were examined by Fred Garmone, counsel
for the defense, and by Dr. Anthony J. Kazlauckas, a
former deputy coroner of the county, on behalf of the
defense (100 Ohio Appeals p. 403).
In the words of the trial court (Opinion overruling
motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence):
"Seldom indeed does the entire interior of a home become as important as the interior of this home seemed
to be in the period in question and while complete
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exclusion of the representatives of the defense would
not be justified, it is only rational to believe that the
Prosecuting Attorney was fully justified in preserving the scene in status quo pending tr~al and its outcome. The two affidavits last mentioned and the
statements of all counsel in open court clearly indicate that the prosecution had no desire to conceal
anything and must lead the Court to the co_nclusion
that there existed neither concealment nor hmdrance
and that the condition imposed, already mentioned,
was merely precautionary. It is not unlikely that
failure to take possession of the property and failure
to take the precaution taken could very well have
been subject to just criticism."

VI.
All of the claimed violations of the petitioner's constitutional rights to a fair trial were passed upon by the
Supreme Court.

In the Supreme Court of Ohio it was claimed that the
petitioner was denied due process of law, but apart from
quotations from "Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science" and several cases, nothing
specific was shown wherein the petitioner was denied
due process of law, in any one of the claimed errors.
The Supreme Court, in its opinion, discusses at great
length the matter of publicity and the various motions for
a change of venue. In its opinion at page 87a of the Appendix to the Petition, it is said:
"It should be borne in mind, however, that the
legal question presented to us is whether the defe~d
ant was accorded a fair constitutional trial by an impartial jury which could decide the issues of fact solely
upon the consideration of the evidence in_ the_ light of
the law given it by the court. That question is not to
be decided on the volume of the publicity or the
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tendency such publicity may have had in influencing
the public mind generally as to the defendant's guilt
or innocence."
After further discussion, the Supreme Court in its
opinion at page 88a of the Appendix continues:
"The same motion, advanced for the same reason,
was renewed on five other occasions during the trial,
and the trial court in each instance overruled the motion.
"We believe the trial court was justified in those
rulings."
Continuing, the Supreme Court said at pages 88a-89a:

"If the jury system is to remain a part of our system of jurisprudence, the courts and litigants must
have faith in the inherent honesty of our citizens in
performing their duty as jurors courageously and
without fear or favor. Of the 75 prospective jurors
called pursuant to this venire only 14 were excused
because they had formed a firm opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. A full panel was
accepted before this venire was exhausted, and defendant exercised but five of his allotted six peremptory challenges.
"In the light of these facts, and particularly in
the light of the fact that a jury was impaneled and
sworn to try this case fairly and impartially on the
evidence and the law, this Court cannot say that the
denial of a change of venue by the trial judge constituted an abuse of discretion."
Then, the Supreme Court said further, at page 94a:
"The facts were presented to 12 qualified jurors
sworn to well and truly try the issues between the
State of Ohio and Sam H. Sheppard. In what was obviously a careful, complete and correct charge, Judge
Blythin instructed that jury as to the law applicable
to those facts. In such a situation, the following words

55
of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Aikens v. State of Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206, 49 L. Ed. 154, 25 S. Ct. 3, are
appropriate:
'But it must be assumed that the constitutional
tribunal does its duty and finds facts only because
they are proved."
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Supreme Court said,
at pp. 94a-95a:
"We have carefully examined the other errors
assigned and find none, either in the admission or
rejection of evidence or in the instructions of the
court, prejudicial to the defendant."

VII.
The petitioner claims that the Supreme Court of Ohio was
an illegally constituted court at the time the court
heard this case.
This is just another example of the numerous frivolous
claims made by the defense. It was at their instance, and
without informing the prosecution of their intention, that
the Chief Justice disqualified himself and appointed another judge. No objection was made prior to the hearing
on this case in the Supreme Court and it was not until
after the court as constituted made its decision adverse to
the defense, that they first raised the issue.
An analysis of Article IV, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution (Pet. Br. p. 59) will disclose that if any of the
judges shall be unable, by reason of "illness, disability or
disqualification" to hear, consider and decide a cause or
causes, the Chief Justice may direct a judge of the Court
of Appeals to sit in the place of such judge on the Supreme
Court, but that only in the case of absence or disability of
the Chief Justice (not mere disqualification) is the judge
having the longest period of service upon the Supreme
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Court authorized to direct an appellate judge to sit. Where
the Chief Justice merely disqualifies himself and is not
absent or disabled, it is the Chief Justice who directs the
appellate judge to sit with the judges of the Supreme
Court.
The defense raised this issue on rehearing before the
Supreme Court of Ohio and their application for rehearing
was denied. This is purely a State constitutional question,
decided by the highest court of the State of Ohio adversely
to the defense and there is involved therein no Federal
constitutional question.

definitely stated that they would give to the defendant the
benefit of the presumption of innocence. They were fully
examined so far as defense counsel desired as to any
knowledge or information they might have of the case.
At no stage of the proceedings did the petitioner offer any
evidence to prove that any juror was in fact prejudiced
by the publicity, and, moreover, a period of two months
and a half intervened between the day of the petitioner's
arrest and the beginning of the trial.
The presumption is that the jurors followed the instructions of the court. A distrust of the jury without
any affirmative showing that they were not to be trusted
in following out the court's instructions is what counsel
for the petitioner urges upon this Court.
The defense repeatedly assert that the newspapers
were hostile to the petitioner and sought his conviction.
Though this unsupported claim is constantly repeated
and grows in vehemence each time it is so repeated, it
is simply not the fact. News agencies such as newspapers
and the radio were greatly interested in the case, as they
would be in any similar case. The news stories and broadcasts giving their respective versions of the testimony in
the case and of the other proceedings had, may not at all
times have been agreeable or pleasing to either the State
or the defense. Certainly, the court has no control over
what the newspapers shall print or what the radio stations
shall broadcast. As far as the jurors were concerned, they
were repeatedly instructed to disregard all such stories
and broadcasts and to decide the case solely on the basis
of the evidence presented in open court and on the law
given to them by the judge.
The claims of the defense that the jury and the officers in charge of the jury during its deliberations were
guilty of misconduct to the prejudice of the petitioner is

SUMMATION.
Essentially, the petition before this Court is based on
the publicity. Much of the publicity complained of occurred long before the trial took place. The trial judge
was thoroughly familiar with the treatment given the
murder mystery by the news media and was certainly in
the best position to determine whether or not the petitioner would receive a fair trial. Much of the newspaper
publicity in this case was inspired by the lack of cooperation of the petitioner with the authorities beginning immedia+ely after the murder of his wife was committed,
by the protective shield thrown around him, and by the
strategy of his counsel. None of the publicity was deliberately promoted by the prosecution. To hold that publicity in and of itself is a denial of due process of law is to
fetter the State in the prosecution of crime and in bringing
to justice the person responsible for such crime. Any
sensational murder such as this brings forth publicity,
some more, some less, but in the circumstances of each
case, the issue before the trial court is whether a fair and
impartial jury can be obtained. The jurors who sat in
the trial of this case were all thoroughly examined and
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based on the mere assertion and argument of counsel.
There is no evidence that the petitioner was prejudiced.
On the contrary, the jurors deliberated patiently, carefully
and thoughtfully for a period of five days, and reached a
verdict which responded to the evidence.
Petitioner has seen fit to place in the Appendix to
the petition for a writ of certiorari the opinions expressed
in some scattered newspaper articles that he did not have
a fair trial. Surely, such opinions are not evidence in
this case and should not be received as a substitute for evidence, nor as a substitute for the well-reasoned opinions of
the trial and reviewing state courts based upon the record.
Again, we have the situation where it is the defense and
not the State that is dragging the newspapers into this
case.
A complete and fair analysis of the record discloses
no foundation in fact for the claims advanced for the
allowance of a writ of certiorari. Nor has the state supreme
court or the trial or appellate state court decided a federal
question of substance not theretofore determined by this
Court, nor in a way not in accord with applicable decisions
of this Court.
On the record there is no real or substantial Federal
question involved herein and the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK

T.
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Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
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